On May 20, 2024, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces issued its opinion in the case of United States v. Stradtmann, Case No.:  23-0223, 84 M.J. 378 (C.A.A.F. 2024).  The opinion from the Court of Appeals for the Armed Services resolved the issue of the requisite mens rea (criminal intent) for offenses under the General Article 134 of the UCMJ.  In particular, the Court resolved an apparent ambiguity that held that recklessness was the lowest form of mens rea to separate lawful from unlawful conduct for the unenumerated General Article offenses.  (See United States v. Gifford, 75 M.J. 140, 147
(C.A.A.F. 2016); see also Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015)).  Under Stradtmann, the Court distinguished the Gifford line of cases, holding that these authorities were only applicable when Congress had been silent on enumerating a mens rea within the statute.  In Stradtmann, the Court was confronted with a circumstance where the President had promulgated a lesser mens rea beneath that of recklessness in seeming contradiction of the Supreme Court's decision in Elonis.  The Court resolved this seeming contradiction as follows:

In the instant case, we conclude that the President acted within his authority when he imposed a culpable negligence mens rea for this Article 134 offense. We specifically note three points. First, Article 134 does not expressly provide a mens rea standard, so the President's election of "culpable negligence" in the accompanying elements and definitions does not contradict the plain language of the statute. Second, we have previously noted that even the minimal mens rea standard of simple negligence may be sufficient [*9] to properly obtain a conviction for some offenses under Article 134. See Tucker, 78 M.J. at 186 n.3 ("To be clear, we are not holding that negligence can never be a mens rea for an Article 134, UCMJ offense. . . . We simply hold that negligence is an insufficient mens rea with respect to this particular . . . offense of providing alcohol to minors." (citing United States v. Kick, 7 M.J. 82, 84 (C.M.A. 1979))). Starting from that premise, the President's imposition of a culpable negligence mens rea standard for the offense of child endangerment serves to limit the "otherwise broad scope" of the statute. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 752, 94 S. Ct. 2547, 41 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1974). And third, this outcome recognizes the President's unique relationship with Article 134 and his ability as the "ultimate military authority" to define the contours of the article through enumerated elements. United States v. Gleason, 78 M.J. 473, 476 (C.A.A.F. 2019). Thus, we conclude that the mens rea standard of "culpable negligence" supplied by the President for the Article 134 offense of child endangerment must be given full force and effect.5 Appellant's conviction therefore stands.